Does ‘the Media’ Have a Future?

Does ‘the Media’ Have a Future?

A b s t r a c t
Media-related practices have so long been configured in a particular one-tomany
pattern that the mass communication paradigm has seemed automatic
as both frame for research and fact of social life. The paradigm is summed
up in the English term ‘the media’. But what if the very idea of ‘the media’
is also imploding, as the interfaces we call media are transformed? Does the
implosion of ‘the media’ generate a crisis of appearances for government and
other institutions? Three dynamics are considered here – technological,
social and political – that are potentially undermining our idea of ‘the
media’ as a privileged site for accessing a common world. The article concludes
that, instead of collapsing, the social construction of ‘the media’ will become
a site of intensified struggle for competing forces: market-based fragmentation
vs continued pressures of centralization that draw on new media-related
myths and rituals.
Key Words centralization, fragmentation, media economics, myth,
‘the media’

Introduction
Media are part of the landscape of everyday life. Although media have
always included a mixture of centralized and interpersonal communications,
media-related practices have so long been configured in a particular
one-to-many pattern that the mass communication paradigm has seemed

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automatic as both frame for research and fact of social life. The paradigm
is summed up in the English term ‘the media’, sometimes treated ‘ungrammatically’
(as in my title) as a singular noun;1 just a decade ago this could
still provide a reference point for critical research (Silverstone, 1999). But
something general about media is changing. At stake is not just a single
relation (the ‘self’ vs the ‘net’, as Manuel Castells [1997: 3] once put it), for
digital media are now integral to how selves appear at all. A deeper transformation
is under way that challenges the ontology on which the mass
communication paradigm was based. Producers and consumers of media are
often now the same person; professional and amateur cultural production
are not distant, but closely overlapping, regions of the same vast spectrum.
Some reach drastic conclusions about the obsolescence of centralized
media institutions, their replacement by new models of collaborative communication
(‘we-think’ as Charles Leadbeater [2007] has called it), even
the death of ‘the media’. My approach, by contrast, is to acknowledge the
new challenges to the legitimacy of media institutions – and those challenges’
basis in a real shift in media’s field of possibilities – but then to explore
a whole range of intersecting pressures that resist the collapse of media institutions.
I approach this via challenges to what I have elsewhere called ‘the
myth of the mediated centre’ (Couldry, 2003), arguing that this myth is
now both more openly contested and more actively produced than before.
A new media geometry?
We need to capture a very general change in the media field (I use ‘field’
here not as the term of art within Bourdieu’s sociology, but as a general
term for the space of possibility in which media are produced and consumed).
The digitalization of media contents and the normalization in
many societies of fast Internet access, whether from fixed points or via
mobile devices, means that, in principle, every point in space is connected
through mediated communication to every other point; and that connection
is always potentially two-way, since either end may be sender or receiver (or
both). As a result, one-way senders – specialist media producers/distributors –
and one-way receivers – ‘mere’ consumers or audience members – become
less common in their pure form, while hybrid sender/receivers, in some
form at least, become more common. By contrast, in the pre-digital era,
‘media’ were productions that radiated outwards from a limited number of
production/distribution points, received by the members of a separate,
much larger ‘mass’: the ‘audience’. This was not technological necessity, as
the early history of radio shows, but the result, first, of the high capital
required for much media production/distribution (Benkler, 2006: Ch. 2;

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Garnham, 1990) and, second, of the fit of such capital-intensive media
with the developing organization of the modern state.
Something has changed, but what exactly? Yochai Benkler in The
Wealth of Networks boldly claims that a fundamental shift is under way:
. . . emerging models of information and cultural production, radically
decentralized and based on emergent patterns of cooperation and sharing,
but also of simple coordinate existence, are beginning to take on an everlarger
role in how we produce meaning. (Benkler, 2006: 32–3)
While market-based media structures will not disappear (Benkler, 2006:
121, 23), ‘we have an opportunity to change the way we create and exchange
information, knowledge and culture’ (Benkler, 2006: 473, see also 162–5).
Benkler models this transformation in an attempt to reorientate policy debates
about digital media (Benkler, 2006: 23). But, however welcome Benkler’s
vision,2 our task in the sociology of communication is different: to identify
not just the possible, but the likely dynamics of change. Yet who can doubt
that media research currently faces profound uncertainties: about what are
‘media’, what is the future of media institutions, what dynamics of change
are the crucial ones?
We should not be misled by the generality of the transformation that
has occurred. Let me explain through an analogy from mathematics. Consider
the transformation from a two-dimensional to a three-dimensional world: the
result is to transform the space of objects, but this tells us nothing about
what particular objects will exist in the new three-dimensional world. For
most or all objects in that world may along their third dimension have a value
of zero or close to zero; they may be basically flat, and so treatable like twodimensional
objects. So the shift from two-dimensional to three-dimensional
geometry only describes a change in abstract possibilities. Similarly, Benkler
captures well how new configurations of media consumption and media
production are possible in the abstract (and in some specific cases), changing
our understanding of how a future information infrastructure might be
built (Benkler, 2006: Ch. 3), but this tells us little about what actual
configurations will predominate.3
More specifically, Benkler tells us nothing about whether, and why,
the demand for information and media might change (Delli Carpini, 2001),
to fit with the potential shift in supply he identifies, and even less about
people’s usage of the new media landscape. His discussion of Internet architecture,
for example, draws exclusively on the literature on links between
websites (Benkler, 2006: Ch. 6) and says nothing about how such links
might relate to users’ practice of following those links (or not). Yet understanding
the terrain of habitual use is crucial to analysing how the abstract

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possibilities of all technologies develop into everyday culture (Marvin,
1987; Silverstone, 1994). Benkler also fails to address the wider constellations
of practice and social organization built around media use. These constellations
involve the wider framings of practice and social organization. The
idea of ‘mass media’, as a framing of the media field, has for a century seemed
to fit automatically with the ‘nature’ of society and media. What if this also
is being undermined? If so, Benkler’s vision would have much more in its
favour. If by contrast there are good reasons to doubt whether that idea will
change, then the weight we give to claims such as Benkler’s changes
completely. It follows that our attention, as sociologists of communication,
should be directed not to isolated challenges to the binary divisions between
producer and consumer, professional and amateur media producer, but
towards the wider dynamics shaping the landscape in which the production
and consumption of media occur. To put it more drastically, does ‘the media’
have a future? If not, what are the consequences? If yes, that social construction
will continue but in what new forms?
The death of ‘the media’?
Political economy approaches to mass media have always needed a cultural
supplement. If we define those approaches broadly as concerned with the
‘ways that communicative activity is structured by the unequal distribution
of material and symbolic resources’ (Golding and Murdock, 1991: 18; my
emphasis), then it is not enough to note the highly unequal distribution
of resources that makes media mass media. While mass media are, in one sense,
‘just there’, they need to be made sense of, legitimated; ‘living with’ the
existence of media institutions is part of the wider organization of economic,
social and political production, indeed the sustaining of the nation-state in
modernity. This intensifies the significance of political economy analyses:
for by being naturalized through cultural means (narratives, rituals, categories,
discourse),4 the material inequality in symbolic resources that media institutions
represent becomes itself more fully entrenched (Couldry, 2001);
the ‘hierarchy of the media frame’ becomes naturalized so that those outside
media institutions fail even to recognize their acts of media production
and dissemination as ‘media’ (Couldry, 2000: Chs 3, 7 and 8).
I have tried to develop such issues by looking at beliefs about media
institutions and, particularly, the idea that ‘the media’ stand in for a social
centre (Couldry, 2003). By ‘the myth of the mediated centre’ I mean the
claim that ‘the media’ are our privileged access point to society’s centre or
core, the claim that what’s ‘going on’ in the wider world is accessible first
through a door marked ‘media’. This myth about media enfolds another
myth about social ‘order’ (Wrong, 1994), ‘the myth of the centre’: the idea

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that societies, nations, have not just a physical or organizational centre – a
place that allocates resources – but a generative centre that explains the
social world’s functioning and is the source of its values.
This myth of the mediated centre is not simply an explicit ideology
imposed from above; if it was, it wouldn’t work. Instead it is, in part, a
form of understanding we enact in our talk, action and thoughts. Nor is
the mythical object – ‘the media’ – a trivial construction. The term ‘the media’
condenses an answer to Durkheim’s 100-year-old question about what
bonds sustain a society as a society.5 Durkheim’s account of how social
bonds are built through ritual has remarkable overlaps with how we have
talked about ‘the media’ – as what everyone is watching, as the place where
we all gather together (Couldry, 2003: Chs 1 and 2). We must be wary of
functionalism in our readings of society and media. But some version of
that functionalism is a real force in everyday life, and helps install media
institutions, for all their particularity, as a site of general importance in our
lives (Debord, 1983).
But what if the very idea of ‘the media’ is also imploding, as the
interfaces we call media are transformed? Does a crisis in the notion of ‘the
media’ generate a ‘crisis of appearances’ for government and other institutions?
Three dynamics – technological, social and political – are potentially
undermining our sense of ‘the media’ as a privileged site for accessing a
common world.
Technological fragmentation?
Does the technological multiplication of media interfaces (fixed and mobile,
primary and aggregative) itself make any unitary construction of ‘the
media’ unsustainable? That would be misleading. What I loosely call the
‘technological’ challenge to the idea of ‘the media’ comes not from technology
itself: the Internet’s distinctive ability to link up previously separate
contexts (think of YouTube) makes it easier in principle to sustain
something like ‘the media’ as a common reference point. The ‘technological’
challenge more plausibly comes from two complex factors related to,
but distinct from, changes in technology: media habits and changing
media economics.
Media habits The older notion of ‘the media’ was in part sustained by the
practical convergence of habits of media consumption, the way people
could assume others were doing much the same as them, when they switched
on the TV or the radio (and producers could make parallel assumptions).
True, this in part derived from the sheer convenience of the information
and entertainment bundles media evolved: the prime-time news bulletin,

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the newspaper delivered or collected every morning, the daily or weekly
instalments of a soap opera. But that previous convenience was based on
scarcity. In an era of information plenty, convenience works in a different
way. What is convenient may be not large media packages (with advertisements
built into them) but the glance past online news headlines 10 times
a day. Hence industry fears that traditional media forms are on the brink
of calamitous change: no newspapers within 10 years; a new generation
that doesn’t even remember what it was like to watch a TV news bulletin.
What if, through the convergence of once separate media, people’s trajectories
across the media landscape become so varied that neither audiences
nor industry can assume a pattern any more?
We need, however, to look cautiously at the available evidence. Here
there are important differences between the UK and the US. In the UK,
in spite of much hype to the contrary, the Internet is very far from taking
over from television as people’s principal media focus. According to recent
UK figures from Ofcom (Ofcom, 2007: Figure 3.1), only 6 percent in
2006 used the Internet as their main news source compared with 65 percent
for TV; while hours watching terrestrial news still (at nearly two hours per
week) dwarfed those spent on Internet news sites (just over an hour a
month), a multiple of eight (Ofcom, 2007: Figure 3.4 and Table A2.26).6
Overall UK TV viewing rose slightly from 3.6 to 3.7 hours daily between
2002 and 2007 (Ofcom, 2007–9). While exactly comparative European
figures are difficult to obtain, in Germany in 2008, 76.5 percent still used
TV daily for news, compared with 14.9 percent for Internet (Oemichen
and Schröter, 2008: Table 9), and overall TV viewing again rose (from 214
to 225 minutes daily) during 2002–7.7
In the US – the origin of the most drastic prognoses of change – the
picture differs, not surprisingly given much earlier Internet diffusion.
While regular US figures on people’s main news source are not available,
a Harris poll of June 2007 suggests a much narrower advantage to TV news,
with 39 percent quoting network or cable TV as their main news source,
vs 18 percent for the Internet (cited in Miller & Associates, 2008: 107);
and television news consumption at 30 minutes per day compares with
nine minutes per day for Internet news consumption, less than half the UK
multiple (Pew, 2008: 9). Yet even this different picture is stable, with time
spent consuming TV news changing little since 1996, well before the
Internet’s main growth.
So will the significant minority in the US (and increasingly in the UK)
who have the Internet as their main media focus ever become a majority?
Industry debate assumes the new generation of media consumers is fundamentally
different. But the perennial difficulty of age-based variations is

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to distinguish major shifts between generations from matters of life-stage.
No one is suggesting the age-related factors that shape long-term media
habits – owning or renting one’s living space, having a stable partner and/or
children, having regular paid work – are becoming irrelevant to media use.
So while the move away from hard copy newspapers among the young
bears many signs of being terminal (perhaps because online sites substitute
well for most of our uses of newspapers), the case of television is much less
clear. Even in the US, more people (on 2004 figures) use TV to multitask
while online, than the other way round (VSS, 2005: 177). So television
may well remain the primary medium for most people for the foreseeable
future, even if television content is for some audience sectors more often
delivered via computers than television sets.
Media hype about the pace of change generally underplays the role of
habit in media use (Couldry et al., 2006). Maybe new ways of simplifying
media use online are becoming habitual: what Philip Napoli (2008: 60)
calls the potential ‘massification’ of the Internet whereby most online activity
converges around rather fewer sites than we would first expect. Changing
media habits’ implications for the myth of the mediated centre remain
uncertain.
. . . and shifting media economics While the direct economic risks of the
digital landscape for media industries are well known (falling advertising
revenues for traditional media, an unresolved search for how to make stable
profits from selling access to people’s trajectories online), it is reasonable
to assume that some solutions will be found, even if at the cost of major
industry restructuring. But Joseph Turow’s (2007) pioneering work on the
audience selling process within media suggests that this shifting economic
terrain could undermine the myth of the mediated centre even more drastically.
Turow argues that the increasing difficulty of reaching consumers in a
digital landscape encourages the targeted search for high-value consumers;
in the long-term this will erode the idea that media producers are selling
(and so through their media productions targeting) a general audience.
Indeed, high-value customers are less and less reached through specific media
packages (in which particular advertising can be placed) and increasingly
reached through continuous online tracking which targets them, as they move
online, with advertising tailored to their individual online consumption.
How complete this projected shift will be must, in turn, depend on
the changing habits of media use just discussed, but Turow has, I believe,
uncovered a key cultural dynamic within media’s economic landscape, working
against the construction of media institutions as having general relevance
any more. But there may be other counter-dynamics which simultaneously

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are reinforcing the construction of ‘the media’. This is where we need to
turn to the two other tensions to which that construction is subject.
‘The media’ and the social
The second quite different reason why the familiar construction ‘the
media’ might be being destabilized is social. The myth of the mediated
centre has for decades been condensed, in part, in categories that capture a
sense of social compulsion to keep up with ‘the media’ (Couldry, 2003:
96–101; see also Hagen, 1994). The word ‘liveness’ captures our sense that
we must switch on centrally transmitted media to check ‘what’s going on’:
a major news event or anticipated entertainment event (Bourdon, 2000;
Feuer, 1983). But what if new forms of ‘liveness’ are now emerging
through online interfaces and mobile media that are primarily interpersonal
and so potentially more continuous than mass media have ever been?
Is there emerging a sense of social ‘liveness’, mediated, but not by central
media institutions (Couldry, 2004)? Manuel Castells’ recent book on
‘mobile youth culture’ suggests that mobile digital media enable young
people to ‘set up their own connections, bypassing the mass media’
(Castells et al., 2007: 1). So will interpersonal media become people’s
primary mode of connection, with centrally transmitted media becoming
incidental to our checks on what our friends are up to?
Again the situation is more complex. There is not only the ‘life-stage
or generational shift’ issue, but huge commercial pressures to access such
new social spaces for commercial purposes. If we take social networking
sites (SNS), their capacity to intensify a sense of social ‘liveness’ is obvious,
but it is very unclear whether this will develop in opposition to, or in
tandem with, connections to centralized media. Media institutions (BBC,
NBC, music majors, commercial brands) are building profiles in social
networking sites. We know that personalized data on SNS are of great
interest to marketers. In addition, the intensity of social feedback loops on
SNS makes them particularly well suited to create a ‘buzz’ around both
niche and general products. This can feed back into mainstream media
themselves: leaving aside various media incidents where horizontal networking
sites such as YouTube have played a key role, it is interesting to
note that, of UK newspaper websites, it is The Sun that draws most of its
traffic from social networking sites, more than twice as much as its newspaper
rivals (Hitwise, 2009: 10).
Instead of interpersonal media becoming divorced from centrally
produced media flows and offering an alternative social ‘centre’ to that offered

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by the media, it is more likely that ‘social’ media and centrally produced
media become ever more closely linked. The social dynamics of the online
environment provide no reason to think ‘the media’ will wither away, only
that the components required to sustain that construction will change,
with perhaps uneven consequences for different actors.
‘The media’ and politics
This leads us to a third factor – another potentially stabilizing one for the
construction of ‘the media’ – politics. ‘The media’ in Britain at least, with its
early public broadcasting, have always stood in for a link to the state as the
legitimate focus of social and political struggle. In Tony Parker’s interviews
after the 1980s UK miners’ strike, one miner remembered when Margaret
Thatcher went on TV to condemn those on strike:
. . . and then the day came when she said me and my mates were the enemy
within. Within our own society, that it was our work that had created. . . .
In all my lifetime, those words made more impression on me than anything
anyone else’s ever said. (Parker, 1986: 23)
‘The media’ have served well as the site where governments appear to
the people, and equally where the people appear to governments. We might
go further and see the construction of ‘the media’ as underwriting a space
of appearances for government as well as other major institutions. But can
we assume that the construction of ‘the media’ will continue to perform
this role in the future? We know – in Britain at least – that interest in
electoral politics (at 51 percent) is at historically low levels, with fewer than
50 percent of those under 25 saying they are likely to vote at the next election
(Hansard Society, 2008). To explain such figures by simple apathy is, as
Russell Dalton (2000) among others has argued, a mistake. In the Public
Connection project which I led at the London School of Economics
between 2003 and 2006, even those engaged through media with UK
national and local politics felt they had few places to take action and little,
if any, sense that government recognized their engagement (Couldry et al.,
2007: 189). This suggests a long-term problem for governments, if digital
media’s intertextuality makes it easier to choose not to expose ourselves to
political news (Prior, 2008: 257). So will governments adapt by using social
media or other online entertainment forms to appear to their populations?
Certainly, we should not expect governments to remain disengaged
from the media’s fate. President Obama’s use of SNS in his 2008 campaign
was closely watched by the UK New Labour government, which believes

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it has implications for how public services communicate. Two arguments
for discounting governments’ interest in the construction of ‘the media’
should be rejected. One would be that, based on the evidence of the US
neoconservative regime, governments will care less about their general
popularity, targeting increasingly narrow niches of the population (a variation
of Turow’s argument for political marketing). But it is not just positive
support, but basic legitimacy that is at stake in the space of appearances the
media provide; basic legitimacy, as the current financial crisis has demonstrated,
remains a fundamental asset even if states accept a role as merely a
‘node of a broader network of power’ (Castells, 1997: 304). This links to
the second misleading reason for dismissing governments’ interest in shoring
up the construction of ‘the media’: that the myth of the mediated centre
is only plausible in the dense fabric of the nation-state, and nation-states
now matter less. But globalization does not simply entail the weakening
of nation-states, since this ignores the complex dynamics within nationstates,
some of which (for example, economic and executive power) may in
some countries be strengthened by transnational forces (Sassen, 2006). The
construction of ‘the media’ can easily find its place within the ‘multiple
partial normative orders’ of a globalized world (Sassen, 2006: 10).
We should also be wary of the argument that, simply because new
forms of horizontal political cooperation are emerging online, this has
positive consequences for wider democratic engagement. There is no
doubt that the new media ‘geometry’ enables very different types of
interaction between governments, state authorities and citizens from
those of the pre-digital era. The aftermath of the protests against the
London G20 meeting on 1 April 2009 offers a vivid example: protesters
or general observers produced video material for quick circulation to
challenge police narratives of events and open up official accounts to
direct scrutiny in new ways. Note, however, the role of mainstream
media (particularly the BBC and The Guardian) in orchestrating these
new possibilities of witness. Consider the video of a seeming police
assault on a bystander, Ian Tomlinson (who later died), publicly released
on 8 April: as of midday 9 April the YouTube version had had 35,000
views,8 but it is difficult to believe that the views of the same video from
The Guardian and BBC websites were much higher. That is not to deny
that peer-to-peer exchanges may sometimes generate fast and effective
challenges to powerful actors without passing through mainstream
media (Benkler [2006: 219–25] offers one example), but equally important
is media corporations’ obvious interest in channelling such processes
through themselves.

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Conclusion
Rather than ‘the media’ disappearing, the subtle play of interdependencies
for which this term stands is already shifting into an open-ended crisis
of appearances, affecting many actors (media corporations, commercial
interests generally, governments, civil society). Instead of collapsing, ‘the
media’ will become a site of a struggle for competing forces: market-based
fragmentation vs continued pressures of centralization that draw on new mediarelated
myths and rituals. The construction ‘the media’ will continue to frame
not only the activities of media institutions, large and small, but also the
actions of individuals that operate across the producer–consumer division.
Because it has lost the unquestioned, unchallenged status of a ‘fact of nature’,
‘the media’ now must be more actively defended and reaffirmed; uses of that
construction will be increasingly contested by many actors, not just by media
institutions themselves. Meanwhile pressures of audience fragmentation
closely tied, as Turow argues, to the changing economics of media industries’
advertising income-base will operate not in contradiction to but against the
background of media’s increasing insistence on their general importance in
our lives. There are many areas (consumption, fashion, sport, celebrity, ‘reality
production’, media events, politics) where the reproduction of the myth of the
mediated centre can be actively researched in the coming years.
The point is not to deny the possibility of change in the media field –
many dynamics of change have been noted in this article – or to deny we
might be seeing the start of processes that will eventually challenge the
paradigm of mass communication. The point instead is to recognize that,
behind our academic paradigm of ‘mass communication’, lie many continuing
social, political and economic forces which it is our task to trace,
not judge in advance.

kuromi note chapter 22 : 我关心白玫瑰

看到台湾今日的白玫瑰关怀协会
我关心这个议题
也有一些看法

最近台湾对于女性受害的案件
都给于极奇怪的判决

近日
一名女生晚上骑机车
等红灯的时候
被隔壁的男骑士袭胸
监视器画面由拍摄到
竟然判无罪
真是!@#$%%^&*

白玫瑰
日后在电传所
有机会我会参与

kuromi note chapter 21 : 新加坡的空间其实很大

 新加坡的面积很小？
是的
从地图上看来
但生活上一点都不小

怎么说呢？
这一次去新加坡阿
发现新加坡人的生活空间很大
因为
两人的座位都是一个人坐
不论身边有老人、孕妇还是残障
都视而不见
视而不见
时运高看不到

站在公车上动歪西倒的我
看着一堆空位
还有头低低脸贴在手机上的新加坡人
唉
他的国家那么努力
结果养出这样的人民

不要怪中国人太多
再多也是你们开门让人家进去的

kuromi note chapter 20 ： 正视自己的问题——占有欲

发现自己占有欲很强
常常抓着东西不肯放手
理所当然的觉得
他必须永远在我这边

小时候
外婆来我们家
我觉得很难过
一直以来最注意我的妈妈
把所有时间给了外婆
还没上幼儿园的我
竟然吃醋了

我记得我跟妈妈说
100%的爱
50%给我
其余的给其他人

妈妈问我
如果以后你的孩子这样对你说
你会怎样
我说
我会告诉孩子
好的，我50%都给你
你的50%也是我的

我大学一个学长说过
人的爱岂是是非黑白和数目字可以轻易衡量和判断的

长大之后
这样的占有欲扩张到许多人事物
只要是曾经拥有的
不轻易放手
（怪不得身上的脂肪也不走XD）
一张纸
一份礼物
一个朋友
一段经历
现在发现自己的占有欲
好累

占有欲虽然强大
但不至于去抢他人的东西
很清楚地坚持不抢他人的东西
（其实根本是不希罕……）

日本海啸大地震
姐姐匆忙的回来
留下很多珍贵的东西在日本
回想自己留在台湾的
可能他一本书的价值就等于我的全部了
偶尔听她叹气
如果是我或许会忧郁症呢

手抓得有点累了
很想洒脱一些
江山易改
本性难移
慢慢来吧~kuromi

kuromi note chapter 19 : 迷迭香烤鸡

如题
很想尝试烤一只迷迭香烤鸡
去台湾之前试试看好了^^

买了一盆迷迭香
都在打吃的主意

kuromi note chapter 18 : 正视和珍惜自己的认真

整理东西的过程发现
我这个研究所
并不是众人甚至是自己一位那么容易得来的
从大三
就一直盘算着
然后大四
仔细阅读简章
毕业后特地回台湾
见老师
找资料
反复审核资料
对！我是那么认真且努力的
推上研究所

我要记得自己的努力
我要记得自己的付出
不要轻言放弃
不要轻易怀疑自己所拥有的
最好的东西
是自己创造的
不是别人给你的

kuromi note chapter 17 : 有些事情要放得下

有些事情要放得下
心宽
看什么都开心了

在整理东西
在去台湾之前要封箱
毕竟
一去就两年了
kuromi
说好两年的
就要坚强的在台湾两年
不论风吹雨打
都要学成归来

面对学生一封封的道别信
还有和他们的回忆
那两班的名单
全都是我的珍品
同学们会长大的
我是他们遇过的一位班导师
我是他们曾经的一位华文老师
而他们却是我
人生仅有的两班同学

我好爱他们
偶尔会想他们
过的好吗？
爱笑hibari
很酷的志森
超可爱的pika
字体娟秀的怡婷
教我魔方的嘉美
还有很多很多的大家

心宽
人会开心一些
洒脱
只为离别不那么凝重